PROTECTING WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
IMMIGRATION REFORM
ARTHUR N. READ
OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN
IMMIGRATION LAW ON WORKER RIGHTS

Immigration "reform" has become one of the hottest topics
on the national political scene over the past several years.
Unprecedented community mobilization of immigrant rights
advocates in the Spring of 2006 has created a political climate in
which there is a strong momentum for legalization of
undocumented immigrants in the United States. Nonetheless,
Congressional debate in the 109th Congress appears likely to fail
to achieve positive comprehensive immigration reform. The
demands of those who advocate immigration restriction,
particularly in the House of Representatives, and the asserted needs
of business interests appear likely to have serious adverse
consequences on the wages and working conditions of workers if
legislation is adopted in this Congressional session.
The failure to address the presence of more than ten million
foreign born undocumented immigrants and migrants and the
insistence on draconian enforcement procedures are likely to
increase the degree to which unauthorized foreign-born workers
will be victimized by unscrupulous employers. In addition, there
is likely to be a continued expansion of "temporary" guest worker
programs without adequate attention to mechanisms to protect
against adverse impact on the wages and working conditions of all
workers.
This article seeks to focus advocates for immigrant and
workers rights formulating a progressive alternative to current
immigration law on the need to recognize and confront the
economic incentives for employers of new immigrants, migrants
and "temporary" workers to undercut worker rights. The adverse
impact on the employment rights of workers from immigrant and
" The author has been General Counsel of Friends of Farmworkers, Inc.
in
Pennsylvania since 1982. He has a J.D. from New York University School of

Law in 1976.
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minority communities is particularly intense.'
While seeking
humane immigration laws, immigrant and minority communities
need to work together to win changes in employment laws that will
protect the workplace rights of all workers and overcome the
tendency to utilize such new workers to undercut worker rights.
The failure to fully articulate a pro-immigrant and pro-worker
political agenda has created opportunities for anti-immigrant forces
to seek to mobilize African American communities in opposition
to rights for immigrant workers.
When the rights of undocumented and migrant2 workers are
not protected, the rights of all workers are diminished.
Unscrupulous employers seek out undocumented immigrants or
temporary workers because they believe that there are no
consequences for violating their rights. These employers gain a
competitive advantage over employers who abide by the law. This
creates a perverse incentive for employers to hire undocumented
workers over citizens or authorized workers. The position of
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 223 (James P. Smith &
Barry Edmonston eds., 1997) ("The one group that appears to suffer significant
negative effects from new immigrants are earlier waves of immigrants,
according to many studies."); RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., IMMIGRATION AND
OPPORTUNITY: RACE, ETHNICITY AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 15
(Frank D. Bean & Stephanie Bell-Rose eds., 1999) ("[S]ocioeconomic status
seems to operate to condition the implications of immigration. Immigration may
have worsened the economic situations of those in the population with lower
socioeconomic status, including many African Americans."); see also George J.
Borjas, The Economic Benefits from Immigration, J. ECON. PERSP. Spring 1995,
at
3,
10-11,
available
at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-GBorjas/Papers/EconomicBenefits.pdf
("Ironically, even though the debate over immigration policy views the
possibility that immigrants lower the wage of native workers as a harmful
consequence of immigration, the economic benefits from immigration arise only
when immigrants do lower the wage of native workers.").
2 In this context the author is utilizing "migrant worker" in the comprehensive
terms of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which provides that "[t]he
term 'migrant worker' refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has
been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national." See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G. A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/1
(Dec.
18,
1990),
Art.
2(1),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/m-mwcp 1.htm.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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citizen and authorized workers is weakened when they confront
abuse or discrimination because their undocumented coworkers
have fewer legal avenues for redress of labor violations, including
unlawful retaliation, and therefore they have far less incentive to
participate in efforts to improve conditions.
My views on this issue are guided by historical, economic,
and sociological reading on the impact of new immigrant, migrant,
and other foreign-born workers on the terms and conditions of
employment for more established immigrant communities.
However, most importantly, my perspective is shaped by the
practical experience of over 30 years of legal advocacy for worker
rights and, in particular, for immigrant worker rights.3 This
While a law student at New York University from 1973-1976 and as an
attorney through the spring of 1979, I worked through the Labor Committee of
the New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild in projects that
attempted to provide assistance and representation to workers with employment
related problems while concomitantly employed at a small labor and civil rights
law firm that combined the representation of progressive unions committed to
organization of unorganized workers with assistance to rank and file caucuses
and workers in workplaces without unions or with unions that failed to
adequately represent workers in their bargaining units.
3

Since May 1979, I have specialized primarily in the representation of migrant
farmworkers first in New Jersey and since 1982 in Pennsylvania. Since October
1982, my work has primarily been as General Counsel of Friends of
Farmworkers, Inc. See Friends of Farmworkers, Inc., http://www.friendsfw.org.
That legal representation has predominately been of Latino migrant workers,
including Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, Mexican, Dominican, Cuban,
Guatemalan, and El Salvadorian workers. It has also included assistance and
representation to African-American, Haitian, Jamaican, and Asian workers. In
recent years, this work has gradually broadened to include larger number of
workers in industries outside of primary agriculture such as food processing and
landscaping.
My legal work has included the representation of low-wage worker membership
associations and organizations that have developed strong positions on
immigrant and worker rights issues. This work has included the representation
since its founding in 1979 of CATA (El Comit6 de Apoyo a Los Trabajadores
See CATA,
Agricolas or the Farmworker Support Committee).
http://www.cata-farmworkers.org.
From its founding during a strike in April 1993 until April 2005, I represented
the only union of workers in the mushroom industry in Pennsylvania. The
Kaolin Workers Union's membership and leadership are Mexican workers in the
largest agricultural industry in Pennsylvania. That Union has successfully
organized a workforce of predominately documented Mexican immigrants and
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
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experience includes legal work relating to two principal temporary
worker Frograms: the H-2A program for temporary agricultural
workers 5 and the H-2B program for temporary non-agricultural
workers.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Key policy recommendations of this article for
immigrant worker activists are consistent with those that
immigrant worker rights advocates persuaded the national AFLCIO to adopt as statements of official policy of the then-unified
organized labor movement in February 2000.6

migrants in an industry that is overwhelmingly dominated by employers who
predominately employ undocumented Mexican workers. See Kaolin Workers
Union, http://friendsfw.org/Links/KaolinWorkers.htm.
In May 2003 at the National Low-Income Immigrant Rights Conference cosponsored by a broad spectrum of organizations, I organized and moderated the
panel discussion on "Guestworker Programs: Designing a Viable Alternative
That Does Not Lead to Worker Exploitation." See Nat'l Immigr. Law Ctr.,
Workshop Details: 4th National Low-income Immigrant Rights Conference,
http://www.nilc.org/DC_Conf/dc-conf2003/wkshpdetails.htm.
4 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2000)
(defining temporary agricultural worker as "an alien ... coming temporarily to
the United States to perform agricultural labor or services ... of a temporary or

seasonal nature."); 20 C.F.R. § 655.90 (2005) et seq. (implementing the H-2A
program); see also U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment & Training Admin., H-2A
Certification, http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/h-2a.asp (discussing
the H-2A program).
5 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 10 1(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (2000)
(defining temporary non-agricultural worker as "an alien ...who is coming
temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary service or labor if
unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be
found in this country."); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.1(2005) et seq. (implementing
the H-2B program); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment & Training Admin., H2B
Certification
for
Temporary
Nonagricultural
Work,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/h-2b.asp
(discussing the H-2B
program).
6
See AFL-CIO Principles On Immigration: Ensuring Worker Rights And A
Better
Life
For
All
Working
Families,
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/civilrights/immigration/upload/immigrationpolicy.p
df, [hereinafter AFL-CIO Principles].
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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The AFL-CIO Principles on Immigration include four key
principles:
Principle1 - Legalization
Legalization means a broad program allowing workers from
around the world who have contributed to their workplace and
community here in the U.S. to adjust their status to permanent
resident alien....
Principle 2 - Repeal and Replacement of Employer Sanctions
and the 1-9 System
The current system of 1-9 enforcement and employer sanctions
should be repealed and replaced with a new law creating
penalties for employers who seek to violate labor laws based on
a worker's immigration status, and providing stiff penalties for
smuggling, document fraud and for those employers who break
labor laws as a matter of business practice ....
Employer sanctions must be replaced with a new system
targeting employers who try to use a worker's immigration status
to intimidate those seeking to organize or otherwise exercise
labor and employment rights.
The new system should have enhanced penalties for those
employers who knowingly recruit undocumented workers, and
for those employers involved in document fraud for commercial
gain.
Workers who file charges alleging labor violations, such as
unfair labor practices and wage and hour complaints, should be
protected from deportation....
Principle3 - Reform, Not Expansion, of GuestworkerPrograms

In 1999, delegates to the 23rd AFL-CIO Biennial Convention formed a Special
Committee on Immigration, chaired by HERE President John Wilhelm and
made up of union leaders from every sector, to study and recommend changes to
the AFL-CIO's immigration policy. The changes in AFL-CIO policy which had
since 1985 supported employer sanctions for hiring undocumented immigrants
were adopted at the February 2000 meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council.
See James B. Parks, Recognizing Our Common Bonds AMERICA@WORK (AFL-

CIO,
Washington,
D.C.),
May
2000,
available
at
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/magazine/commonbo
nds.cfm; see also Press Release, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Calls for New Direction
in U.S. Immigration Policy to Protect Workers, Hold Employers Accountable
for
Exploitative
Working
Conditions
(Feb.
16,
2000),
at
http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr02l62000d.cfm.
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A new large-scale guestworker program should not be the focal
point of legalization efforts.
Guestworker programs have a long, sad history resulting in
oppressive working conditions, wages at less than the going rate,
and denial of opportunities to U.S. and long-term immigrant
workers.
Although employers typically claim that 'market forces' should
determine wages and benefits, they are unwilling to let 'market
forces' work when it comes to guestworkers. A large
guestworker program that ties workers to an employer or an
industry will serve only to thwart market forces that would lead
to increased pay and benefits for all workers.
The guestworker program cannot become a modem day bracero
program that ties foreign workers to bad jobs for long periods of
time with the hope of a provisional or permanent resident status
at the end.
All labor rights, including the right to join a union, must extend
to guestworkers.
Principle4 - Family Reunification
Any proposal must address the backlog of people waiting to
legally join their close relatives. 7
This article focuses on issues raised by above AFL-CIO
Principle 2 (repeal of "employer sanctions") and Principle 3
(preventing the expansion of guestworker programs).
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS
Widespread acceptance that the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 adoption of "employer sanctions" 8 has failed
7 AFL-CIO

Principles, supra note 7, at 2 (emphasis in original); see also Arthur
N. Read, Let the Flowers Bloom and Protect the Workers Too: A Strategic
Approach Toward Addressing the Marginalization of Agricultural Workers, 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 525 (2004) (discussing approaches to resolve gaps in
current labor law which deny agricultural workers and many temporary workers
employed through labor contractors the right to organize).
8 See Immigration and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1)(A) (2000)
(providing that it is unlawful for a person to "to hire, or to recruit or refer for a
fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien .. .with respect to such employment.") (emphasis added);
see also 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1)(B) (2000) (rendering it illegal for employers to
fail to verify the legal status of all new employees by checking documents
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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to curtail undocumented immigration and, indeed, increased
exploitation of undocumented workers 9 has not resulted in any
serious political effort to remove "employer sanctions" from
current immigration law. Despite the AFL-CIO's public embrace
of the above principles, the post-9/11 political environment has
discouraged legislators from even proposing legislation for the
repeal of employer sanctions; efforts to develop new approaches
toward immigration law and to develop policies that might legalize
the undocumented immigrant communities have faced a
resurgence of anti-immigrant sentiment and fear.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 10 to elevate immigration law

prescribed by the Attorney General and by recording the information on the
designated form); 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(2) (2000) (criminalizing continued
employment of an alien knowing that the alien has become or is unauthorized);.
9 Prior to the enactment of the employer sanctions provisions in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, commentators predicted that it would be a
failure. See, e.g., John E. Huerta, Immigration Policy and Employer Sanctions,
44 U. PITT. L. REV. 507, 508 (1983) ("[E]mployer sanctions will not work to
reduce significantly the flow of undocumented aliens into this country. Although
employer sanctions will not accomplish their stated goal, they will have negative
effects on our economy and society."); R. Paul Faxon, Comment, Employer
Sanctionsfor HiringIllegal Aliens: A Simplistic Solution to a Complex Problem,
6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203, 205 (1984) ("[T]he current employer sanction
proposals seem to offer limited hope for accomplishing their purpose and, if
successful, might result in consequences which outweigh any benefits.").
Analysis since the enactment of the law has confirmed those predictions. See,
e.g., Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy
of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,
356 (2001) ("[I]t is widely acknowledged that the law has been ineffective in
curbing illegal immigration into the United States."); Maria Isabel Medina, The
CriminalizationOf Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions And MarriageFraud,
5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 690 (1997) ("There is evidence that sanctions
generally have been ineffective in substantially reducing the employment of
undocumented workers."); Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing
Secret Of Immigration Policy: Understanding Why Congress Should Enact An
Enforcement Statute For Undocumented Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 643 &
n.123 (2000) ("Employer sanctions have been largely unsuccessful in
eradicating the incentive for illegal immigration.").
1o See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)
(holding that an undocumented worker fired for union-organizing activities,
where the employer was unaware of worker's illegal immigration status at the
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
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"employer sanctions" applied as undocumented worker
employment sanctions" above employment law protections for
workers seriously set back many years of consistent advocacy by

time of discharge, is ineligible for a backpay award under the National Labor
Relations Act).
The decision has inspired a flood of law review commentaries on the
inappropriateness of the decision. See, e.g., Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 LA RAZA L.J. 103,
104 (2003) ("[T]he opinion could have a significant and broad ripple effect.");
Thomas J.Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the
Supreme Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of
Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. J. 313, 339 ("[T]he Supreme Court has
dealt a blow to workers, both legal and illegal in the United States.") (2003);
Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 507 (2004) ("The Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic
deserves criticism on many grounds."); see also Rebecca Smith et al., National
Employment Law Project, Undocumented Workers: Preserving Rights and
Remedies after Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 1 (Apr. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.nelp.org/document.cfm?documentlD=305 ("The U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB...
has had a devastating effect in immigrant communities nationwide.")
" See supra note 10. There is a lack of enforcement of "employer sanctions"
against employers. In the last ten years immigration law enforcement has
instead targeted undocumented workers for sanctions.
The author represented workers in a meat processing plant following a 1994
immigration raid where approximately 90% of the work force was
undocumented and where the employer had promised workers that it would help
them get immigration papers if they crossed union picket lines during a strike.
Immigration agents initially threatened workers who did not agree to immediate
voluntary departure with criminal prosecution.
The Immigration and Nationality Act was amended in 1990, 1991, 1994, and
1996 to create "Penalties for document fraud." See 8 U.S.C. §1324c. The
increased focus on criminalization of civil immigration violations by
undocumented workers was a particularly strong element of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; Medina, supra note 10, at 676 ("Nowhere is the
trend towards the use of criminal sanctions in the immigration context more
evident than in the recently enacted Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996."). See also M. Isabel Medina, Employer Sanctions
in the United States, Canada And Mexico: Exploring the Criminalization of
Immigration Law, 3 Sw. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 333 (1996) ("Increasingly,
legislative policy has looked to the criminal law to address the problem of
undocumented immigration.").
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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73

immigrant worker employment advocates.' 2 There appears to be no
prospect for a prompt legislative reversal of the Hoffman Plastics
decision. 13
12The author participated in efforts with other advocates for worker rights
beginning in 1995 to persuade officials in federal agencies including the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Department of Labor, and
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to adopt internal guidelines which
recognized the importance of enforcing labor rights for undocumented workers
in order to minimize employer incentives for the utilization of such workers
precisely because of their lack of labor protections
This advocacy had led to the adoption by the late 1990's of formal policies by
the federal agencies which were intended to protect the employment rights of
immigrant workers. See, e.g., NLRB Memorandum GC 98-15, Reinstatement
and Backpay Remedies for Discriminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens
In Light of Recent Board and Court Precedent (1998), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared files/gcmemo/gcmemo/gc98-15.asp;
EEOC,
Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to
Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws
(1999),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html;
Memorandum Of Understanding Between the INS, Dep't of Justice and the
Employment Standards Admin., Dep't of Labor (1998), available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whatsnew/whd/mou/nov98mou.htm,
INS, Operating
Instruction 287.3a, Questioning Persons During Labor Disputes (1996)
(redesignated as Special Agents Field Manual § 33.14(h)).
13 The Hoffman decision has not resulted in the passage of legislation which
would overcome its effects, despite the introduction of bills containing the
following provision:
Section 274A(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1324a(h) (2000)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(4) BACKPAY REMEDIES.--Backpay or other monetary relief for
unlawful employment practices shall not be denied to a present or
former employee as a result of the employer's or the employee's-(A) failure to comply with the requirements of this section; or
(B) violation of a provision of Federal law related to the employment
verification system described in subsection (b) in establishing or
maintaining the employment relationship.
Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil
Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. § 702(a) (2004); Safe,
Orderly, Legal Visas and Enforcement (SOLVE) Act, S. 2381, H.R. 4262, 108th
Cong. § 321 (2004). Both of these bills were defeated in committee in both
houses of Congress.
See also id. at § 322:
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
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The 10 9 th Congress has seen increased efforts by
immigration restrictionists to tighten pre-employment verification
systems and to increase the severity of employer sanctions while
further criminalizing unauthorized foreign born workers.' 4 These
proposals offer no effective mechanism for the millions of
unauthorized workers presently in the U.S. to obtain documented
status, thus virtually guaranteeing that undocumented workers will
be driven underground and made more vulnerable to employer
exploitation. The probable result of such legislation is that
undocumented immigrants and migrants would be forced to accept
employment from unscrupulous employers willing to risk
sanctions in return for an exploitable workforce.
GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS

Business interests have focused their legislative advocacy
on arguing for massive "temporary" guestworker programs.
(B) PROHIBITION ON THREATS OF REMOVAL- It is an unfair
immigration-related employment practice for any employer, directly
or indirectly, to threaten any individual with removal or any other
adverse consequence or legal process pertaining to the immigration
status or benefits of that individual for the purpose of-(i) intimidating, pressuring, or coercing any such individual not to
exercise any right protected by Federal or State labor or employment
law, including section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29
U.S.C. 157); or
(ii) retaliating against any such individual for having exercised, or
having stated an intention to exercise, any such right.
(C) PROHIBITION ON UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION- It is an
unfair immigration-related employment practice for any employer,
except to the extent specifically authorized or required by law, to
discriminate in any term or condition of employment against any
individual employed by such employer on the basis of the
immigration status of such individual.
See also Anita Sinha, Nat'l Immigr. Law Center, Democrats Introduce
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Proposal: Safe, Orderly, Legal Visas and
Enforcement
(SOL VE)
Act
(2004),
available
at
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/cdev/SOLVE-summary_052504.pdf.
14 See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, 109th Cong., Tit. VII.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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Business interests have sought to incorporate such guestworker
proposals into proposals for earned adjustment of legal status for
currently undocumented workers in order to build on immigrant
form of legalization for
community activists' support for some
5
undocumented workers in the country.'
In January 2004, President George W. Bush
embraced business demands for an expanded temporary worker
part of his political program for immigration
program as
"reform."' 6 As will be discussed further below, such expanded
temporary worker programs, in the format in which they are likely
to be established, are both unworkable and highly undesirable from
the perspective of both the temporary immigrants themselves and
other workers.
If we accept the principle that employer sanctions are
useless to discourage employers from preferring to utilize
vulnerable and exploitable undocumented workers, 17 it makes
15 The Essential Worker Immigration Coalition is one of the groups which has
See
emerged to advocate employer interests in immigration "reform."
http://www.ewic.org.
16 See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Immigration
Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), reprinted in Press Release, Office of the White House
Press Sec'y, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program,
Press
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040l07-3.html;
Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure
at
available
7,
2004),
(Jan.
Reform
Immigration
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 1/20040107-1 .html.
17

[T]he problem of illegal immigration.. .can only be understood in the
supply-and-demand principle enshrined in
context of the
traditional U.S. economics .... [T]he

illegal immigration problem

the
is no different from our national drug problem, where all
traffic interdiction and supply eradication efforts ...have had little
impact on U.S.

sales

and

consumption.

.

.

. [H]arsh

immigration laws will only make illegal aliens more vulnerable to
smugglers and employers, raise the costs of smuggling even higher,
and force the smuggling syndicates to grow even more brutal and
immune to government powers.
PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND

AMERICAN LABOR 7 (1997)

As long as employer sanctions are in effect, new federal laws against
illegal immigration ...

will not be effective because they only drive
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sense instead to structure minimum employment terms and
conditions of work at levels high enough to minimize the adverse
impact on wages and general working conditions of workers in
industries which employ significant percentages of non-citizens. 18
Such adverse effect minimum wage rates' 9 could be based
upon existing strengthening concepts for adverse effect wage
the illegals further underground, making detection more difficult,
while enhancing the employer's control over them. Employer
sanctions are actually useless and counterproductive, they only
function as a "symbolic law," a pretense of state action to check
illegal immigration with which to placate the American public.
Id. at 185.
18 The procedure for establishing such a triggering threshold must avoid
encouraging discrimination on the basis of citizenship status or national origin at
any specific workplace.
The concept for triggering such enhanced minimum wage protection for jobs in
industries which employ significant percentages of non-citizens rather than
a
utilizing
workplace-specific standard is to avoid any employer argument that refusal to
hire any specific job applicant was for a bonafide non-discriminatory economic
reason.
19The concept could be applied on a flexible basis by specific geographic areas
such as standard metropolitan statistical
basis for determining prevailing wages
temporary labor certification systems,
C.F.R. § 656.40(b)(2) (2005) ("[T]he

areas (MSAs). A similar MSA-specific
is utilized in the current permanent and
including the H-2B system. See 20
prevailing wage for labor certification

purposes shall be the arithmetic mean . . . of the wages of workers similarly

employed in the area of intended employment."); U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Employment & Training Admin., Attachment to GAL No. 2-98, Prevailing
Wage Policy for Nonagricultural Immigration Programs, Section II.C,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/dmstree/gal/gal98/gal_0298a.pdf, at 3.
A principal defect of the existing H-2A (agricultural) and H-2B (nonagricultural) temporary worker systems is that minimum adverse effect wage
rates frequently act instead as maximum wage rates since workers seeking to
work at rates higher than the established minimum adverse effect wage rate can
be refused employment and are not considered "available" workers.
An H-2 worker may be brought into the country "if unemployed persons capable
of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country." 8 U.S.C.
§1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (2000). Workers who seek terms better than the
established prevailing or adverse effect wage rate are considered unavailable for
this purpose. See Flecha v. Quiros, 567 F.2d 1154, 1156 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978) (holding that Puerto Rican workers were
unavailable for work in New York because the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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rates2° and prevailing wages for employers seeking to utilize
either agricultural or non-agricultural temporary workers. Such
minimum wage rates would apply to all workers (whether supplied
through subcontractors, temporary employment agencies or
otherwise) employed in such jobs. Equally importantly, concepts
of joint employment must be expanded to bar the owners of places
of employment from hiding behind subcontractors and temporary
employment agencies in evading minimum terms and conditions of
employment. It is also critical that any adverse effect wage rate be
directly enforceable by actions for damages by any workers
employed
at
workplaces
employing
such
workers.22
Simultaneously, strong whistleblower protections must be enacted

set minimum terms for their hiring beyond those required under the U.S.
Department of Labor's prevailing and adverse wage rate determinations for
workers in New York).
20 For agricultural H-2A workers adverse effect wage rates are set in accordance
with procedures at 20 C.F.R. §§655.107 and 655.207 (2005). See U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Employment & Training Admin., Adverse Effect Wage Rates -Year
2006, http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/adverse.asp. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT TRAINING ADMIN., ETA HANDBOOK 398, H-2A
PROGRAM HANDBOOK (1988) sets forth various methodologies in Chapter 2 for
determining prevailing wages and prevailing practices. There are significant
practical deficiencies to these methodologies. However, if such wage rates truly
act as minimum rather than maximum wage rates, the deficiencies of such
methodologies are less serious.
21 For non-agricultural H-2B workers, prevailing wage rates are set in
accordance with procedures at 20 CFR § 656.40 (2005) for permanent labor
certifications. See also supra note 20 (discussing this procedure for setting
prevailing wage rates).
22 See Mary Bauer et al., An Analysis of the Labor Provisions of
McCain/Kennedy
(2005),
available
http://friendsfw.org/Advocates/immig/AnalysisLaborProvisionsMcCainKennedy.pdf.

at

That article discusses at length provision of the proposed Secure America and
Orderly Immigration Act, S.1033, 109th Cong. (2005) which fail to adequately
protect worker rights. The article urges that an adverse effect prevailing wage
rate standard should be set applicable to all workplaces with any unauthorized /
undocumented workers and any new guestworkers recruited by the employer or
its agents or in their first job in the U.S. Bauer, supra at 5. The article further
discusses the importance of creation of a private right of action to enforce any
guaranteed wage rate. Id. at 10.
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in order to protect all workers with complaints about violations of
minimum employment standards.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Effective immigration legislative political advocacy has
long involved otherwise peculiar political alliances. Much of the
general political dialogue about the potential negative economic
impact of new immigrant and migrant workers on other workers
has been from an anti-immigrant political perspective that has
sought to severely restrict immigration into the country.
In response, immigrant advocates have sought to stress the
many positive macroeconomic benefits that result from continued
immigration. Many of the studies of the economic effects of
immigration have concluded that there are minimal negative
impacts on "domestic" workers, while concluding that the
economy overall has benefited from the ability of employers to pay
lower wages to recently-immigrated workers. In order to be
successful, advocates for expanded immigration have had to join
forces with employer lobbyists who have sought changes in
immigration law designed to benefit the interests of employers. 23
23

This article does not discuss in detail the Agricultural Job Opportunity,

Benefits, and Security (AgJOBS) Act, S. 359, H.R. 884, 109th Cong. (2005)
which are the result of careful compromises between agricultural employers and
farmworker advocates including the United Farm Workers.
Agricultural worker advocates, including the author, and farmworker
organizations have endorsed this proposed legislation as the best compromise
available to agricultural workers. See Farmworker Justice Fund, Farmworker
Immigration
Legislation:
Update
on
AgJOBS,
http://www.fwjustice.org/LEGISLAT.HTM. See also California Rural Legal
Assistance Foundation, Nat'l Clearinghouse on Agricultural Guest Worker
Issues, Legislative Update, http://www.crlaf.org/gworkers.htm; Press Release,
United Farm Workers of America, UFW urges action on AgJobs: 'The need is
great', available at http://www.ufw.org/legislation/agjobs/21005asr.htm
The proposal provides strong protections for currently workers undocumented
workers who qualify for earned adjustment of status under the proposed
legislation.
The proposal does not include changes to the H-2A program which would be
consistent with the recommendations of this article. The distinction is
particularly important in considering whether the AgJobs proposal should be
extended to encompass other low wage non-agricultural workers as some
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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The legitimate need of unions to protect workplace rights
historically has placed them at political odds with advocates of
expanded immigration.24 As organized labor has increasingly
recognized the political imperative to reach out to low-wage
immigrant workers, advocates for immigrant worker rights have
struggled with how to balance a pro-immigrant position with the
difficulties of protecting terms and conditions of employment for
workers.
At the same time the focus of the immigrant advocate
community on winning some form of legalization or earned
adjustment of status for undocumented immigrants has taken
priority over challenges to the inherent failure of temporary worker
"guestworker" programs in meeting needs of low wage workers.
This article seeks to stress the need for continued emphasis on
those problems in reaching legislative compromises.

members of the employer EWIC coalition would advocate. See supra note 16
(discussing EWIC).
24 It was the organized labor movement that fought in 1985 for inclusion of
employer sanctions in the 1986 IRCA immigration amendments, supra note 7.
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THE BIG LIE - UNAVAILABILITY OF WORKERS

The "big lie" inherent in employer demands for liberalized
temporary worker programs is that there are not currently workers
available to fill jobs has not been adequately challenged. That lie
was central to the January 7, 2004 public declaration of President
George W. Bush stating his support for a new "temporary worker
program." The President's statement said:
I propose a new temporary worker program that will match
willing foreign workers with willing American employers, when
no Americans can be found to fill the jobs. This program will
offer legal status, as temporary workers, to the millions of
undocumented men and women now employed in the United
States, and to those in foreign countries who seek to participate
in the program and have been offered employment here. This
new system should be clear and efficient,
so employers are able
25
to find workers quickly and simply.
The background fact sheet released to support President
George W. Bush's statement spelled out the "big lie" more
specifically:
Current immigration law can ... hinder companies from finding

willing workers.
The visas now available do not 26allow
employers to fill jobs in many key sectors of our economy.
Richard M. Estrada, Commissioner U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, testified in relationship to agricultural
employers December 7, 1995 before the U.S. House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims that:
[O]ne often gets the feeling that when growers say they can't find
workers, they fail to complete the sentence. What they really
President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy
(Jan. 7, 2004), reprinted in Press Release, Office of the White House Press
Sec'y, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 1/20040107-3.html.
25

26

Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Fair and

Secure

Immigration

Reform

(Jan.

7,

2004),

available

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 1/20040107-1 .html.
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mean is that they can't find workers at the extremely low wages
and working conditions they offer....
Moreover, labor economists point out that California
agribusiness in particular does not want so much a stable supply
of labor, but rather a dependable system of constantly disposable
and replenishable labor. Foreign labor is best for their needs
precisely because it represents a never-ending pool and because
the constant replacement of such labor ensures that the entire
workforce will, in the classic phraseology of those who are
admitted but
familiar with the bottom line of illegal or legally
27
not totally free labor, "work hard and scared.,

Immigration advocates can certainly agree with the need to
permit the millions of undocumented workers currently working in
the country to do so legally, but the notion that such workers
should be periodically recycled out of the country and replaced by
new workers employed as temporary2 8 workers should be vigorously
resisted by all immigrant advocates.

UNDERSTANDING GUEST WORKER TEMPORARY LABOR PROGRAMS

Immigrant rights advocates are able to arouse some
sympathy by accusing advocates of expanded "temporary" labor
programs of recreating the failures and abuses of workers by the
discredited "Bracero" program, which was in existence from 1942
27

Guest Worker Programs: Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Immigration and

Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
Richard M. Estrada, Commissioner, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform),
See also Kwong,
available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/120795.html.
supra note 18, at 208 n. 3-4
28 As discussed below, temporary worker programs are clearly not in the interest
of worker rights advocates or immigrant communities themselves.
It is equally apparent, however, that guest worker programs fail in the
fundamental premise of forcing guest workers to leave the country. See Nicole
Jacoby, Note, America's De Facto Guest Workers: Lessons From Germany's
GastarbeiterFor US. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1569, 1652
(2004) ("The de facto guest worker policies instituted in the United States over
the past two decades ....have merely resulted in the long-term settlement and
marginalization of undocumented workers."). See also VERNON M. BRIGGS JR.,
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 121-27 (1984)
(discussing the European experience).
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until its abolition in 1964. However, very few immigrant rights
why the
advocates have a very clear understanding of exactly
29
"Bracero" program resulted in abuses of worker rights.
The structural inability of the Mexican government on to
adequately protect the rights of its citizens working as agricultural
workers in the United States not only parallels the experience of
workers from Caribbean nations under the H-2 agricultural worker
system 30 but also is similar to the experience for U.S. citizen
29

Various sources provide a capsule history of the Bracero program.

See

Michael Holley, DisadvantagedBy Design: How The Law Inhibits Agricultural
Guest Workers From Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
575, 583-585 (2001); Michael J. Mayerle, Comment, Proposed Guest Worker
Statutes: An UnsatisfactoryAnswer to a Difficult, If Not Impossible, Question, 6
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 559, 564-466 (2002). See also KITTY
CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE

I.N.S. (1992); ERNESTO GALARZA, FARM WORKERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS IN
CALIFORNIA, 1947-1960 (1977), at 203-276; ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS
OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY (1964); LINDA C. MAJKA & THEO J.
MAJKA, FARM WORKERS, AGRIBUSINESS, AND THE STATE 136-166 (1982).

Recently material related to the Bracero era has been made available on the
Project,
Bracero
Marentes,
See
Carlos
internet.
Amongst the documents made
http://www.farmworkers.org/benglish.html.
available there is a version of the Bracero contract of August 1942. See
Perhaps what is most striking
http://www.farmworkers.org/bpaccord.html.
about that contract is the extent of its nominal protections for workers brought in
as Braceros.
30 Cindy Hahamovitch provides a historical study of the early usage of
See CINDY
: ATLANTIC COAST
FARMWORKERS AND THE MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY, 1870-1945, at 166temporary

foreign

HAHAMOVITCH,

workers

THE

East Coast

in

FRUITS

OF

THEIR

agriculture.

LABOR

181 (1997).
During World War II in April 1943 shortly after the establishment of the
Bracero program with Mexico, the British West Indies (BWI) temporary foreign
labor program was established through agreements with governments of the
United States and the British West Indies (Jamaica, the Bahamas, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, Dominica, and Barbados). See BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 102-03.
The BWI program became the H-2 program as part of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. No. 82-414, §
101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 66 Stat. 163, 168 (1952). During the existence of the Bracero
program, Mexican workers were not eligible for the H-2 temporary worker
program. See CALAVITA, supra note 30, at 134. Until recent years the program
primarily admitted temporary agricultural workers from the British West Indies.
See BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 107 (writing in 1984 that "about 90 percent of the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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83

Puerto Rican migrant
workers recruited under the Puerto Rican
31
system.
contract
Few immigrant rights advocates have a clear understanding
of the legal structure and scope of existing "temporary" worker
programs. This failing is particularly serious because employer
advocates of "reforming" existing "temporary" worker programs
seek to eliminate even the nominal protections inherent in such
existing programs while exponentially increasing their size and
scope.
The two principal temporary labor programs currently in
operation are the H-2A agricultural temporary labor program and

number [of agricultural H-2 workers] admittedly annually are from the British
West Indies (predominately from Jamaica).").
31Beginning during World War II in 1944 agricultural workers were recruited
through the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to meet labor shortages.
HAHAMOVITCH, supra note 31, at 174.

See

Surprisingly little has been published about workers' experience with the Puerto
Rican contract labor system, which provided thousands of workers each year
from the mid-1940's to the late 1980's to East Coast agriculture, especially New
Jersey. The Puerto Rico contract system was regulated by P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
3, § 319 (2004). Predecessor statutes have regulated the recruitment of those
workers as well. See 1943 P.R. LAWS 445; 1947 P.R. LAWS 387, art. 1.
That law attempts to protect Puerto Rican migrant workers by establishing
minimum terms and conditions of employment before such workers could be
recruited for employment in the mainland. Because those legal protections went
beyond the bare minimum required for H-2 temporary workers, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was forced to amend Public Law 87 to permit
the Puerto Rico Department of Labor to waive its terms when Puerto Rican
workers would otherwise be unavailable for H-2 jobs. See Orchard Mgmt. Co.
v. Fernando Varges Soto, 463 S.E.2d 839, 842 (Va. 1995); see also Flecha v.
Quiros, 567 F.2d at 1156.
As a former attorney with the Farmworker Division of Camden Regional Legal
Services in New Jersey during the period 1979-1982, I am familiar with
representation by Camden Regional Legal Services, Puerto Rico Legal Services,
and the ACLU Farmworkers Rights Project of New Jersey of numerous Puerto
Rican farm workers under the Puerto Rican contract system. Despite its
nominal protections, the Puerto Rican contract was a wholly ineffective means
for protecting the rights of workers, since the continuation of the contractual
arrangements between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the grower
associations were dependent upon keeping agricultural employers happy.
32 See supra note 5.
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the H-2B 33 non-agricultural temporary labor program. Ironically,
the documented history of exploitation of agricultural workers and
some prior advocacy for such workers has given H-2A agricultural
workers theoretical protections and remedies the non-agricultural
H-2B workers lack. 34 Although neither of these programs is
currently of the size or scope that the "Bracero" program was at its
peak, both fail to adequately protect the rights of such workers or
of other "domestic" workers in industries that utilize such
"temporary" H-2 workers.
North Carolina farmworker attorney Mary Lee Hall
correctly asserts that:
For a democratic society, the fundamental problem with a guestworker program is that guest workers are not free and have no
rights of membership in society....
When I say that H-2A workers are not free, the lack of freedom
has several different aspects:
They cannot change employers.

They cannot bargain over their terms and conditions of
employment.
Their remedies are limited and less than those afforded other
workers.
They are subject to deportation and banishment from the

program if 35 they
complaining.

complain

or

are

even

suspected

of

33 See supra note 6.

The U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, has promulgated
regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 501 for the enforcement of contracts for H-2A
14

agricultural workers.

Actual enforcement of such provisions is seriously

deficient. See Holley, supra note 30 at 598-599. However, no equivalent
regulations for federal government enforcement of contracts for H-2B nonagricultural workers have even been promulgated.
35 Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights of H-2A Farmworkers, 27 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 521, 527-529 (2002). See also Holley, supra note 30, at 594616 (containing another excellent discussion from an experienced farmworker

advocate of the H-2A system).

Michael Walzer, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
56-61 (1983) (arguing that the inability

DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
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The central flaw from a worker rights point of view of all
existing "temporary" worker programs is that employers (or
employer associations) control the right of such temporary workers
to lawfully enter the country and any such worker is bound to
continue legal employment only through the employer who
sponsored their entry into the country as an H-2 worker. 36 Any
temporary worker program that will succeed in reversing the
incentives of employers to exploit such workers must change those
terms.37 The ability of employers to blacklist workers who make
complaints and deny them re-entry of temporary worker visas is a
critical flaw since it vests employers with an overwhelming ability
The
to control workforces subject to such recruitment. 38
requirement that a worker may retain her legally authorized status
only so long as they remain employed by a particular employer is
servitude that should be
inherently a form of compulsory
39
society.
this
in
unacceptable

of guest workers to obtain permanent residency is inconsistent with political
justice in a democratic state). See also James Woodward, Commentary:
Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE
TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (Brian Barry &
Robert E. Goodin eds.) (1992). ("The creation of a class of permanent residents
who are restricted from becoming citizens (if they should wish to do so) or any
similar system of differential status among a state's permanent inhabitants is
fundamentally incompatible with liberal egalitarian ideals.")
36 The binding of the temporary worker to a particular employer was also a
characteristic of the Bracero program.
37 American Bar Association, Coordinating Committee on Immigration Law,
Resolution Supporting Legislation to Legalize Noncitizens Residing in the
United States who Demonstrate Significant Ties to the U. S. and Meet Certain
available
at
Prerequisites
1
(2002),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations02/115a.pdf
(Recommending that "any temporary worker or legalization program
guarantee[] basic labor rights with the ability to change employers.")
38 The threat to blacklist goes beyond the individual worker to potentially
encompass communities in which aggrieved workers live. Thus, many workers
who have been fired are discouraged from making complaints by family
members and friends from the same community for fear that they will be
blacklisted as a result of these complaints.
39
Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: Guest Worker
Programsas Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 465, 470-71
(2002) ("Freedom to leave an employer and to take employment elsewhere
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The existing temporary labor certification systems remove
those jobs from the competitive labor marketplace altogether as a
practical matter since H-2 employers can get workers who are
guaranteed to be unable to enforce their legal rights. Once an
industry begins to utilize H-2 workers as its primary labor source,
the ability of other workers to bargain for improved terms and
Existing
conditions of employment is seriously undercut.
guestworker programs quickly transform employers to a permanent
dependency on the control over workers inherent in a program
where the legal status of the worker is dependent on continued
employment with the employer. Administrative mechanisms for
determining if there are available "domestic" workers40 for H-2A
and H-2B jobs prior to labor certification by the Department of
Labor for jobs are impractical and unworkable.4 '
We represented a client membership organization which
opposed the right of employers in the Pennsylvanian mushroom
industry, which employs thousands of workers to produce nearly
half of the mushrooms in the country, to qualify for temporary H2A agricultural workers. Although the basis of our challenge was
that the employment was not of a temporary or seasonal nature, the
reason for that challenge was that the methodology for establishing
the prevailing wage rate for piece rate work performed at most
would give workers greater power to assert their rights against employers and
thus prevent abuses.").
40 "Domestic" workers in this context refers to any workers in the country who
are authorized to work including foreign nationals with employment
authorization.
It does not include undocumented workers without work
authorization.
41 This problem is even more severe for H-2B non-agricultural workers since
there is no requirement to give a "domestic" worker a position filled by an H-2B
worker once that H-2B worker has arrived at the job. In most agricultural jobs,
a "domestic" worker is theoretically entitled to an employment position through
50% of the employment period. See 20 CFR §655.103(e) (stating the "fiftypercent rule").
The largest numbers of H-2B workers in the mid-Atlantic region are currently
employed in the landscaping industry, which, in turn, has in recent years been
heavily dominated by employers participating in the H-2B system. The typical
recruitment for an H-2B landscaping job will be limited to a single newspaper
ad near Christmas for work to begin in the spring and continue through the fall.
These advertisements seldom generate serious job applications and are not
intended to.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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rapidly in the lowering of wage
workplaces would have resulted
42
industry.
the
rates throughout
In order to force all employers to compete for workers and
to permit workers to organize for improved terms and conditions of
employment, it is absolutely essential that no employer should be
guaranteed workers at a particular wage rate by the government
"Portability" of visas between employers was one area where the
legislative proposals in the 1 0 9th Congress reflected positive
legislative proposals. Several of the guestworker programs under
consideration in the Senate as of early 2006 recognized the
appropriateness of portability of visas between employers.43
EFFECTIVE WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS

Effective "whistleblower" protections for all
workers exposing employment abuses by employers and other
workplace protections are essential to any fair employment
system. 4
42

Under the H-2A system, the statewide adverse effect wage rate will control

unless it is possible to establish that a particular prevailing piece-rate practice is
utilized by more than 50% of employers. Although payment on a piece-rate
incentive basis is the rule for harvesters in the mushroom industry, there is no
single uniform system for computation of piece rates. Of even greater
consequence, a high percentage of employers in the industry relied upon
undocumented workforces who were paid at rates significantly lower than those
paid to documented workers at companies that principally hired such
documented workers. Unionizing workers at Kaolin Mushroom Farms, Inc.
who were in the process of struggling for their first collective bargaining
agreement at the time of the industry-wide H-2A application would have had
their ability to fight for improved terms and conditions of employment severely
jeopardized. That workforce was an entirely immigrant workforce, many of
whom had been documented only over the past 20 years since the passage of the
legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
43 See Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033 & H.R. 2330,
109th Cong. sec. 302(a), § 218A(e) (2005) ("Portability. A nonimmigrant alien
who
section,
this
in
described
was previously issued a visa or otherwise provided nonimmigrant status under
section 101(a)(15)(H)(v)(a), may accept new employment with a subsequent
employer.")
44 Professor Howard F. Chang agrees: "We can also fortify the guest worker's
incentives to complain about abuses with protections against employer
retaliation for whistle-blowers or even bounties or other rewards for those who
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Among substantive protections which members of
the Low Wage Immigrant Workers Rights Coalition have urged be
included in protections for workers are the following:
0 All Workers Should Have a Safe Workplace. Workers
should not be forced to work in unsafe conditions.
0 All Workers Should Have Real Access to the Protections of
Labor and Employment Laws. Laws should protect all workers,
regardless of race, gender, national origin, age, religion, or
citizenship status.
0 Workers Should Have Access to Meaningful Remedies for
Employer Misconduct. All workers should have means available
to correct unlawful conduct by employers. Perverse incentives
are created for employers if some workers are excluded from
meaningful remedies. Those remedies should be available to all
workers, regardless of race, national origin, gender, religion, age,
or citizenship.
* All Workers Should be Compensated Fairly and Every Job
Should Meet a Set of Minimum Standards. Work should be
fairly compensated in a nondiscriminatory manner. Minimum
standards and nondiscrimination go hand in hand because
standards are undermined unless all workers are treated equally.
Anti-discrimination laws should be reviewed to ensure that all
workers have a meaningful opportunity to obtain relief. Laws
governing compensation and benefits should be fully enforceable
by all workers.
* Workplaces with Immigrants Should Have the Same
Protections as Other Workplaces. Employers should not be able
to misuse immigration laws to circumvent their legal obligations
The rights of low-wage workers are
in the workplace.
undermined by the prospect of workplace immigration
enforcement which makes some workers vulnerable to coercion
and mistreatment. Some employers attempt to take advantage of
that vulnerability. Their ability to intimidate one group of
workers severely weakens the protections relied on by everyone
else. 4
make meritorious claims that their employers are violating the rights of
employees." Chang, supra note 40, at 47 1.
45 See Low Wage Immigrant Worker Rights Coalition, Low Wage Worker
Statement of Principles (2005), available at http://www.nilc.org/DCConf/dcconf2005/dcc05_wrkshpmaterials/1-2_employment sec of confbinder.pdf,

at 17-18. That document describes the Coalition as:
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/5
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REJECT A PURE FREE TRADE IN LABOR ANALYSIS

Academics supporting increased immigration have
frequently trumpeted the success of employers in utilizing recent
immigrants to reduce their costs of production and thereby
producing goods more cheaply for consumers. One of the
principal advocates of this approach is Professor Howard F. Chang
of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, who has written a
series of articles on this topic.46 His initial statement of this
approach sounds appealing to immigrant activists: 47
Free trade in all services, including labor services, would imply
free movement of people across borders. To provide many
services, workers must cross borders to where the work must be
performed, either
on a temporary basis or to accept permanent
4
employment. 48

The Low-Wage Immigrant Worker (LWIW) Coalition is a
collaborative of state and national advocates and organizers working
to improve the conditions of immigrant laborers. The mission of the
LWIW is to support this community of advocates by sharing
information and strategies impacting immigrant workers at both the
local/state and national level. The LWIW is co-convened by the
AFL-CIO, NILC [National Immigration Law Center], and National
Council of La Raza.
Id. at 17 n.*
46 See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration As Free Trade: Economic
Welfare And The Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997)
[hereinafter Chang I]; Howard F. Chang, Migration As InternationalTrade: The
Economic Gains From The LiberalizedMovement Of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L.
& FOR. AFF. 371 (1998-99) [hereinafter Chang II]. See also Howard F. Chang,
Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions As Employment
Discrimination, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 291 (2003); Chang, supra note 40.

47 A different and insightful analysis of labor migration in a historical and
international context supports the underlying impossibility of sustaining political
borders as barriers to the movement of labor. See Nigel Harris, THE NEW
UNTOUCHABLES: IMMIGRATION AND THE NEW WORLD WORKER (1995).
See also Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?,51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 264 (2003)
("Experience demonstrates that, at least within modem sensibilities, border
controls cannot be enforced.").
48 See ChangII, supra note 47, at 372.
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However, further elaboration of this approach in its pure
form makes clear that it implies accepting reduced wages for
employment within this country:
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor
internationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class
of labor to diverge widely among different countries. For any
given class of labor, residents of high-wage countries could gain
by employing more immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage
countries could gain by selling more of their labor to employers
in high-wage countries. Economic efficiency in the global labor
market would call for unrestricted migration, which would allow
labor to move freely to the country where it earns the highest
return. Market forces would thus direct labor to the market
Given the large
where its marginal product is highest.
international differences in wages, it should be apparent that the
potential gains from international trade in labor (and the costs we
bear as a result of immigration barriers) are large.4 9
Immigration restrictions impose costs by driving up the cost of
labor, which in turn drives up the cost of goods and services to
consumers. Native workers may gain from higher wages, but
this gain comes only at the expense of employers in the host
country and ultimately consumers. The increase in wages for
domestic labor is a pure transfer from owners of other factors of
production (for example, capital and land) in the host country
Immigration restrictions not only
and from consumers.
but also destroy wealth by
redistribute wealth among natives
50
distortions.
causing economic
Professor Chang himself concedes that unrestrained free
trade in labor may have adverse consequences for immigrant
communities in this country:
Immigration not only expands wealth, but also can have
important distributive effects. Those natives who must compete
with immigrants in the labor market may find that immigration
reduces their real income.

49
50

See Chang II, supra note 47, at 373.
See Chang II, supra note 47 at 379.
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Empirical studies, however, consistently find that immigration
has only a weak effect on native wages. This result may not be
surprising, given that natives and immigrants tend to work in
different occupations and therefore tend not to compete in the
Thus, immigration does have a more
same labor markets.
significant effect on the wages of earlier waves of immigrant
workers, who are close substitutesfor new immigrants.5 1

Professor Chang's proposals for "a 'tariff,' that is, a tax
imposed on immigrants" to replace existing quotas 52 are unlikely
to appeal to immigrant communities or low-wage activists,
although forms of such "tariffs" exist in practice for most
53
"temporary" and undocumented foreign born workers.
Restrictions that set minimum terms of employment and provide
for worker rights may also be viewed as "tariffs" rather than as
quotas, but such costs are appropriately born by employers who
benefit from the labor of workers rather than by imposing them on
low wage immigrant workers.
CONCLUSION

Immigrant rights advocates seeking immigration law
reform should fight for employment law reforms that protect the
rights of all workers in employment regardless of their
immigration status and should resist any proposals for expansion
of guest worker programs. It is appropriate for organized labor,
51 See Chang II, supra note 47 at 408 (emphasis added).
52See ChangI,supra note 47 at 1155; ChangII, supra note 47 at 378.
13 One of the particular problems with current H-2 temporary worker programs
in the United States is the imposition of costs in the form of visa fees,
immigration processing fees incurred by employer and charged to workers,
recruitment fees, and travel costs which are either paid in advance by such
workers or deducted from their pay. The 1 1th Circuit has ruled that such
expenses and deductions must be repaid by employers at the beginning of
employment to the extent that they reduce wages below the minimum wage. See
Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2002). Such
fees often in practice continue to reduce workers wages to unacceptably low
levels. This is particularly true where workers are employed for only very short
periods of time. In practice Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and
Medicare (collectively "Social Security") deductions are taxes on undocumented
(and H-2B) workers since such workers do not obtain benefits from such taxes.
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immigrant activists, and low-wage worker rights advocates to
insist that wage levels be set at levels sufficient for a living wage
and to resist employers' use of new immigrants, whether
undocumented or "temporary," in order to exert downward
pressure on wages and work conditions for all workers. Because
of the inherent economic incentives for employers to use new
immigrants, migrants and temporary workers to undercut the
economic and workplace rights of other workers, it is important to
consciously design minimum protections for workplaces that
would otherwise have rights for workers reduced. These are issues
of particular importance to immigrant and minority communities
and should not be ignored.
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